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The relationship between literature and ethics goes back a long way, to foundational 
thinkers such as Plato and Confucius.  It was temporarily forgotten, it would seem, during 
the period of "grand theory" of the 1960s and 1970s, but the return to duodecimo-format 
micro-theories of ethnic, racial, and sexual identity has brought with it a resurgence of 
interest in this approach.  The beginnings of this shift can be seen in the work of J. Hillis 
Miller (The Ethics of Reading, Columbia UP, 1987), and of Tobin Siebers (The Ethics of 
Criticism, Cornell UP, 1988).  Miller's ethics of reading posited a situation in which 
"there is a response to the text which is both necessitated, in the sense that it is a response 
to an irresistible demand, and free, in the sense that I must take responsibility for my 
response and for the further effects . . . of my act of reading" (43).  Siebers, on the other 
hand, focused simply on the "means by which literary criticism affects the relation 
between literature and human life" (2).  Miller's book functioned as an apology for 
deconstruction — its centerpiece is a reading of the role of ethics in Paul de Man's theory 
of reading — whose questioning of the subject, Siebers notes, "makes the study of ethical 
attitudes difficult, to say the least" (2).  These two authors were at each other's throats, so 
to speak, Miller arguing that ethics could only be achieved through submission to 
linguistic indeterminacy, while Siebers reminded us that simply deciding not to decide 
was hardly the ultimate ethical choice.  (See the also the critique of Miller's position by 
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Robert Eagleston, "Reading (:)  the Ethics of Deconstructive Criticism," Ethical Criticism 
[Edinburgh:  Edinburgh UP, 1997]:  61-97. 
 So how does the field of ethics and literature look a decade later?  Surprisingly, 
deconstruction, the demise of which has been greatly exaggerated, seems to have 
triumphed. 
 It makes sense to start with the book by Thomas Keenan, which began as a 
dissertation directed by Miller (with Andrzej Warminski).  Not surprisingly, Keenan's 
definition of the reader's responsibility comes directly from Miller's:  "Reading . . . is 
what happens when we cannot apply the rules.  This means that reading is an experience 
of responsibility, but that responsibility is not a moment of security or of cognitive 
certainty" (1).  Responsibility begins where certainty leaves off.  Typical of 
deconstruction is the subtitle of the first chapter, "On the Impossibility of Justice," which 
opens with a Derrida imitation (almost literally, cf. the first pages of Specters of Marx) in 
which the first few lines of Hamlet are plumbed over the space of three pages, far beyond 
their ability to sustain such interrogation. The exegesis does allow the opening question 
of Hamlet, "Who's there?" to function as a leitmotif for the book and especially for this 
first chapter.  Keenan's arguments for the impossibility of justice point to fundamental 
aporias in concepts such as human rights, which supposedly are innate and natural, but 
which require a vocalized claiming which itself establishes the humanity of the subject of 
justice.  The gist here is that justice is impossible because subjects are impossible.  
Chapter Two tries out this same argument (the deconstructive argument par excellence) 
on the genre of the fable.  The fables of the raven who pretends to be an eagle, and of the 
wolf in sheep's clothing share a thematic similarity in that they concern duplicity and 
pretending to be the Other in order to be achieve one's own goals.  In their negative 
exemplarity, fables themselves, Keenan points out, are all wolves in sheep's clothing.  
The pretense of the raven and the wolf applies to all fables, to all reading, and to all 
subjects, for whom "there are borrowed names, or no names at all" (69). 
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 Keenan next moves to the Marquis de Sade's Philosophie dans le boudoir and its 
relation to freedom.  Sade's aporia is that freedom and justice involve a recognition that 
humans are simply natural creatures — hence, all impulses arise in favor of the health of 
the organism — but that such a teaching can only be imparted through cultural devices 
such as language and literature (fable).  Hence, the impossibility of reading Sade.  A 
similar conclusion is reached with Karl Marx's Kapital in the next chapter, which is 
founded on two questions:  how does Marx's own writing fulfill or contradict his 
injunction for philosophy to change the world? and, how does capitalism get from use-
value to exchange value?  Keenan does not work very hard on establishing the 
relationship between these two questions, but the answer, as we might expect, is that 
Marx is impossible to read, since exchange value — not to mention humanity — is 
spectral.  The chapter on Foucault, perhaps the best and most cogent of the book, probes a 
paradox in the French historian's thinking, which consistently denied such concepts as 
agency and legal subjectivity, while its thinker engaged himself in numerous political 
causes.  A conclusion reiterates the opening thesis.  Keenan's book is not easy reading, 
but is the most consistent and unified of the three under review here, and its ability to 
treat various types of discourse with a single methodology is to be admired.  No doubt its 
tenacious argument that individual responsibility is constructed over an abyss will edify 
readers, though that argument would have benefited from the consideration of a broader 
range of legal and ethical thinkers.  Some who finish the book will perhaps say, however, 
as my students tend to do after reading Paul de Man's work, "this is all very brilliant, but 
just what are we supposed to do with it?" 
 Rey Chow's volume is the least unified of the three.  Her definition of the ethics of 
reading, also deconstructive in its essence, differs boldly from what we might find in a 
dictionary:  "a reading practice must carry with it a willingness to take risks, a willingness 
to destroy the submission to widely accepted, predictable, and safe conclusions.  This 
risk-taking, destructive process is what I associate with ethics, a term I use in contrast to 
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mores and its cognates morality and moralism" (xxii).  Note here that "destructive" is 
synonymous with "deconstructive."  This would seem to be a restatement of Julia 
Kristeva's position in "The Ethics of Linguistics," where she defines contemporary ethics 
as the shattering of codes to give free play to negativity, but Chow's version receives little 
elaboration in the pages that follow.  The opening two chapters present examples of her 
own risk-taking.  Chapter One, "Theory, Areas Studies, Cultural Studies," parlously 
suggests that "grand" theory and cultural studies need each other, when they spend most 
of their time accusing one another of abstraction and triviality, respectively.  Chow 
clearly suggests that cultural studies should be a dialectical sublimation of linguistically 
rich but empirically poor post-structuralist theory and theoryless area studies (which aren't 
directly addressed in the essay).  The next chapter takes on the issue of political 
correctness as fascism.  Chow's ethical purpose here is "to deconstruct our increasingly 
fascistic intellectual environment, in which facile attitudes, pretentious credentials, and 
irresponsible work habits can be sponsored in the name of 'cultural pluralism'" (28).  
Chow goes on to tell a fictional story of a less-than-talented student from a developing 
country who reads little but becomes celebrated and lands a good job due to the liberal 
academies' current enthusiasm for women of color.  This, in Chow's reading, is fascism.  I 
would first respond that I see little difference between this form of academic fraud and 
the one of pseudo-philosophy more prominent in my formative years.  French and British 
accents were de rigeuer back then;  if today they have been replaced by African and 
Indian ones, I'm not sure this can be called an increase in fascism.  I also agree with the 
many historians and cultural critics who warn against diluting our appreciation of 
historical events such as fascism, the Holocaust, and genocide by applying the terms to 
various and unrelated scenarios.  In this case, it is hard to see any positive result from 
equating American academic fascination with the invisible new clothes of the latest 
emperor with the horrors of "true" fascism. 
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 Chapter Three bears the same title as the book as a whole, and turns out to be 
based on a review of some books by Gayatri Spivak and Slavoj Zizek on the basis of their 
shared Marxist revisionism.  The analysis is intricate and tenacious, as Chow explains 
(41-3) how Zizek deconstructs idealist notions which structure subjectivities in both 
capitalist and totalitarian societies.  "Naming is the place where both Zizek and Spivak 
attempt to plot an alternative ethics," the author claims.  For Spivak this means the 
methodology of De Man and Derrida, while for Zizek it is Lacan's ability to demask 
subjectivity and revel in the nothingness at the core of being.  It is not clear how the 
praxis of this alternative ethics is to be carried out, nor how, if at all, it might structure the 
book's remaining seven chapters. 
 From this point on, the topic of ethics recedes into the background, as it becomes 
increasingly clear that the book is a collection of essays and book reviews lacking a 
unified argument.  Some readers might be interested in Chow's reading of the role of 
gender in Frantz Fanon's theories of (post)colonial community, others in her analyses of 
films, and perhaps still others in her studies of contemporary Chinese and Hong Kong 
cultural politics and writing.  Those who seek a more sturdy thread to hold these readings 
together, or further enlightenment into ethics, will be disappointed.  The dashes 
separating the four terms in the book's title turn out to be disjunctive. 
 Colin McGinn is a philosopher of mind, who in this book ventures into the 
territory of art and literature to make his point.  In his conclusion he contrasts a moral 
discourse based on commandments with his own as developed in this book, which 
operates on parables, that is, on stories.  Unlike Keenan, McGinn is untroubled by the fact 
that "a tremendous amount of moral thinking and feeling is done when reading novels (or 
watching plays and films, or reading poetry and short stories)" (174-5).  Approximately 
the first half of his book deals with philosophical problems of ethics.  He argues there that 
goodness and evil are actual conditions of people and acts, and that moral relativism is a 
fallacy induced by the lack of resemblance between statements about ethics and other 
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kinds of constative statements.  He posits that the evil character can defined by a simple 
inversion of the link between pleasure and displeasure:  while most us us take pleasure in 
others' pleasure, the evil character is pained by others' pleasure and pleased by their pain.  
Continuing with the topic of character, McGinn introduces the "Aesthetic Theory of 
Virtue," which argues that moral goodness is perceived as beauty, while evil is perceived 
as ugliness.  Our perception of virtue has not just an aesthetic dimension to it, but in fact 
is an aesthetic perception at its core. 
 By this point, McGinn has begun to adduce several examples from the arts.  He 
argues that the rooms painted by Vermeer, for example, act as allegories of the soul:  
"what we are seeing in these 'interiors' of Vermeer is an aesthetic depiction of the soul 
morally conceived" (108).  He then moves on to examine Vladimir Nabokov's notion of 
"aesthetic bliss," given at the end of Lolita, which defines art as "curiosity, tenderness, 
kindness, ecstasy" (110).  Nabokov's aesthetic theory allies itself with McGinn's moral 
theory:  both link aesthetic perception with moral qualities.  Yet those of us in literature 
might expect here a note of ambiguity to be raised:  is Nabokov/McGinn claiming that the 
undeniable artistic qualities of Lolita automatically transform Humbert's highly unethical 
behavior into moral goodness?  Nabokov has carried out "artistic sleight of hand" (110) in 
making an ugly soul aesthetically pleasing. 
 However, the implications of this are not pursued.  They instead lay the 
groundwork for an extended discussion of Oscar Wilde's Picture of Dorian Gray.  The 
fact that Dorian's portrait changes while his own physiognomy does not provides a 
negative example to prove McGinn's case.  We expect the moral depravity which Dorian 
exhibits to appear in his own face.  Dorian has become a painting, McGinn observes.  He 
has aestheticized his life to the point that it has lost all its moral bearings.  Hence, when 
Dorian goes up to kill the painting at the end of the story, he kills himself.  Mary Shelley's 
Frankenstein is taken as an opposing case:  from the unsavoriness of the "dead matter" 
which comprises his body, to his abandonment by his creator and his subsequent 
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inclination to violence, the monster represents the ugliness of soul each of us bears within 
in some (hopefully lesser) degree.  The extended discussions of the two novels are lucid;  
literary scholars will miss any reference to previous scholarship, or to the fact that the 
book's central position on literature as a vehicle for moral instruction and thought was 
prevalent in Western pedagogy from the Greeks through the nineteenth century.  Indeed, 
the book as a whole is thinly footnoted and has a three-page bibliography. 
 These three volumes — one written from a philosophical orientation, one from a 
cultural studies orientation, and one dancing between these two fields — all have 
interesting things to say about the relationship of ethics to literature, but none of them 
provides a definitive statement on the topic.  That leaves plenty of room for further study 
and speculation. 
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